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CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP AROUND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL
DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
INTRODUCTION
In Richard Wagner’s opera Lohengrin,1 a knight appears at the prayers of a
maiden to defend her against accusations of murder.2 The knight agrees to wed
her on the condition that she never ask his name or from whence he came.3 As
such, when Judge Friendly called the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)4 a “legal
Lohengrin,”5 he was referencing the peculiar origin and nature of this aged
statute. Although we are well aware of the origins of the ATS, its inactivity for
almost 200 years clouded it in an aura of mystery. Now, almost thirty years
after its revival by the Second Circuit, that same court may have stripped the
ATS of its ability to defend its maiden, the victims of tortious actions
attributable to corporate entities.
The ATS has eluded much appellate review due to settlements and quick
dismissals. The Supreme Court has seriously considered its jurisdictional grant
in only one case.6 As such, there remains much mystery about its exact
function and application. By requiring that courts look to the corpus of
international law to determine jurisdiction, the ATS opens the door to judicial
conjecture and confusion on the content of the “law of nations.”7 Although the
recognition of what constitutes substantive international law rules (such as
standards for torture, extrajudicial killings, or forced exile) is a difficult enough
task for the lower courts of the federal judiciary, the scope of those rules, such
as their source, has equally led to conflict among the courts.

1

RICHARD WAGNER, LOHENGRIN (Nicholas John ed., Amanda Holden trans., Riverrun Press 1993)

(1850).
2

See id. at 55–56.
See id. at 57–58.
4 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
5 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
6 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). The Court will review the ATS in the 2011
Term as they have granted certiorari in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). See discussion infra Part V.D.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
3
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It is this conflict of scope that gave rise to the Second Circuit’s September
2010 holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.8 The Second Circuit,
with no briefing of the issue from the parties, reversed an assumption
underlying many ATS decisions against corporations up to that point: that the
ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction over actions against corporate
entities.9 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims alleging human rights atrocities
committed in connection with protests over the defendant corporation’s oil
extraction activities.10 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this dismissal.11
The Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS is
not available for actions against corporations.12 In doing so, the court almost
exclusively looked to one source of international law—custom.13 Yet, the
Statute for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”),14 recognized as
the authority for the sources of international law,15 lists another important and
especially pertinent source: “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.”16 As this Comment shows, the Second Circuit’s failure to implement
this source of international law is a fatal blow to its holding.
This Comment, in Part I, first looks to the history of the ATS and the case
law leading up to the holding in Kiobel. Next, in Part II, the facts of this case
are discussed, followed by an analysis of both the majority and concurring
opinions. Part III contains a discussion of the general principles of
international law as stated in the ICJ Statute, leading to a survey of the world’s
legal systems in Part IV and their treatment of corporations and the imposition
of tort liability. From this, Part V applies the general principles discovered
from these legal systems through an analysis of the majority and concurring

8

Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111.
Id. at 145. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the question dealing with
corporate liability under the ATS is one that goes to the merits or is jurisdictional. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491). This issue will be discussed more thoroughly infra Part
V.D.
10 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472.
11 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 125–45.
14 U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter
ICJ Statute].
15 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 13 (2d ed. 2006); see also ICJ Statute,
supra note 14, art. 38(1).
16 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
9
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opinions, a look to the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, and a
discussion of the dual issues certified by the Supreme Court when it granted
certiorari in Kiobel. Finally, Part VI concludes the Comment with a discussion
of alternatives to the Second Circuit’s bright-line denial of ATS jurisdiction
over corporations, the potential implications of the decision as it stands, and
best alternatives to which the Second Circuit could have looked when deciding
Kiobel.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
Included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS states: “The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”17
Thus, plaintiffs looking to overcome the ATS’s jurisdictional barrier must be
aliens suing in tort for a violation of the law of nations. Unlike other sources of
original federal court jurisdiction, the ATS does not look to the relationship
between the parties,18 nor to the source of the conflict in federal law,19 but
asserts its power under the auspices of international law. This reference to
international law, on its face, creates clear and unavoidable choice of law20 and
separation of powers issues,21 among others. Additionally, there is a general
difficulty raised when municipal courts must construe and apply international
law.
Despite the ATS’s potential to raise these complex issues,22 it lay relatively
dormant for almost 200 years.23 It was awakened by the Second Circuit in
17 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); accord Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Some courts have also
referred to the ATS as the Alien Tort Claims Act or the ATCA. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 943
(9th Cir. 2002); Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
The Supreme Court has used ATS, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004), and, on this basis, this
Comment references the statute in the same manner.
18 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350, with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
19 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350, with 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
20 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring)
(“Lacking the benefit of clear guidance, I presume a federal court should resort to its traditional source, the
federal common law, when deriving the standard.”); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“I do
not agree that the question of Unocal’s tort liability should be decided by applying any international law test at
all. . . . [It] should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles.”). But see Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (noting
that the scope of international law is defined by international law itself).
21 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–89 (2d Cir. 1980).
22 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CIVIL REMEDIES 57 (2008) [hereinafter CIVIL REMEDIES].
23 See Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007). Before its revival in 1980, the ATS
established jurisdiction in two cases, Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,24 a decision which created a doctrine that has become
“a touchstone for promoting effective remedies for serious human rights
violations.”25 In Filartiga, two citizens of Paraguay brought an action to
recover for the death of a family member by torture at the hands of a former
Inspector General of Police.26 The trial court dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds; the Second Circuit interpreted the trial court’s dismissal as reflecting
that, although “official torture violates an emerging norm of customary
international law,”27 the trial court felt “contstrained by dicta” to construe the
ATS as excluding law governing the relations between a state and its citizens.28
The Second Circuit disagreed. Reviving the little-used ATS, the majority
looked to domestic court opinions,29 the UN Charter,30 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,31 and even municipal constitutions32 to hold that
“official” torture is “unambiguous[ly]” and “clear[ly]” prohibited by the law of
nations.33
Filartiga was a groundbreaking decision and victory for human rights.34
Since that case was decided, the ATS has substantially protected victims and
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). In Adra, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland resolved a
custody dispute between divorced Iraqi and Lebanese nationals. See 195 F. Supp. at 859, 867. In Bolchos, the
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, having established jurisdiction under the ATS, resolved a
dispute between two parties over the “rightful” ownership of slaves. See 3 F. Cas. at 810–11.
24 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
25 Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance at 13, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (No. 03-339).
26 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
27 Id. at 880.
28 Id. This constraint came from the earlier Second Circuit cases of Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1976), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
29 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
30 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–82; see also U.N. Charter arts. 55–56.
31 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
32 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (“[T]orture is prohibited, expressly or implicitly, by the constitutions of over
fifty-five nations, including both the United States and Paraguay.” (footnotes omitted)).
33 Id.
34 David J. Bederman, Dead Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human
Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1995/1996) (“In a sense, all current human rights
litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga. The rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute was much like finding the
Holy Grail.”). Writing the opinion, Judge Kaufman recognized the enormity and impact of the decision:
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations of
the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and
collective interest. . . . Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.
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provided civil judgments against those who violate “sufficiently and
constitutionally defined”35 human rights norms.36 Yet, the ATS’s reach was
subsequently judicially limited. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp.,37 the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns was not secured by the ATS, but instead that the sole basis for
jurisdiction in these cases was to be controlled by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.38
Notwithstanding this limitation, the use of the ATS in actions against
private individuals has been bolstered by the courts. In Amerada Hess, the
Supreme Court stated: “The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not
distinguish among classes of defendants.”39 Further, in Kadic v. Karadžić,40 the
Second Circuit held “that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as
private individuals.”41 Yet, in the history of ATS litigation, the concept of
liability for the private corporate person was not confronted in such a direct
manner as it was in Kiobel.
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS has been pursued by
plaintiffs under the theory of aiding and abetting liability.42 This approach has
led to confusion and conflict in the courts over the specific standards for
corporate aiding and abetting liability and acts as a prelude to the holding in
Kiobel. In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,43 “one of the most learned discussions of

Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
35 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820).
36 Some judgments against ATS defendants have ranged from $54 million, Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d
1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006), to $4.5 billion, Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12928, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
37 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
38 Id. at 434. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (“FSIA’s”) jurisdiction in these cases is
substantially limited. FSIA has statutory exceptions under which sovereign defendants could escape liability
where the ATS would have provided it. Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94583, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891, 2892–94 (codified as amended as 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)–(d) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010)), with 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
39 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438.
40 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
41 Id. at 239; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
pt. II, intro. note, at 71 (1987) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as
piracy, war crimes, or genocide.”).
42 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009);
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
43 Unocal, 395 F.3d 932.
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aiding and abetting liability under the ATS,”44 the Ninth Circuit judges were
split on the definition and source of law for the aiding and abetting claims.
Although holding that the case could continue against Unocal, the majority
held that international law supplied the applicable legal standard,45 while Judge
Reinhardt found the cause of action in domestic law.46 The Second Circuit
perpetuated this conflict in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.47 with
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence engaging in an analysis of international law
tribunals and agreements to find the relevant standard,48 while Judge Hall
argued for the application of domestic law.49 Khulumani’s remaining
concurring opinion could be considered the direct precursor to the majority
reasoning in Kiobel. Concluding that the scope of the ATS, as defined by
international law,50 did not cover actions against corporate defendants,51 Judge
Korman drew upon footnote language of the Supreme Court in Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.52
Sosa is one of a short line of cases in which the Supreme Court has given
guidance to the lower courts handling ATS litigation. The plaintiff in Sosa was
a Mexican physician accused of aiding in the torture of a Drug Enforcement
Administration (“DEA”) agent.53 After failed attempts to arrest AlvarezMachain with the help of the Mexican government, the DEA hired a group of
Mexican nationals to abduct and transport him to the United States to stand
trial.54 Following termination of the criminal case, Alvarez-Machain brought a
civil action under the ATS for arbitrary arrest and detention as a violation of

44 Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871, 873
n.20 (2008).
45 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945 (“[A]ll torts alleged in the present case are jus cogens violations and, thereby,
violations of the law of nations.”).
46 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“[T]he ancillary legal question of Unocal’s third-party tort
liability should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint
venture, or reckless disregard.”).
47 Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254.
48 Id. at 270–78 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
49 Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring) (“To derive a standard of accessorial liability, however, a federal court
should consult the federal common law.”).
50 Id. at 312 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hether . . . there [is] a well
established and universally recognized international norm providing for liability of private parties who aid and
abet apartheid.”).
51 Id. at 321 (“The sources evidencing the relevant norms of international law at issue plainly do not
recognize such liability.”).
52 Id. at 311; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
53 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98.
54 Id. at 698.
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the law of nations.55 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, the
Supreme Court sought to “clarify the scope of . . . the ATS.”56
In doing so, the Court made two key holdings. First, the Court held that the
ATS was a jurisdictional statute that does not, of itself, create a cause of
action.57 Although seemingly a victory for the defendant (and the United
States, which argued the same point), the Court refused to accept the notion
that Congress intended the ATS “to be placed on the shelf” until they enacted
subsequent legislation creating causes of action.58 From this holding, important
questions arise: Which causes of action for acts alleged to be violations of the
law of nations are realized under the ATS, and thus, in the municipal law of the
United States? How should the lower courts recognize new actions in the everevolving arena of international law, if at all?
The answers to these questions constitute the Court’s second key holding in
Sosa.59 The Court held that to recognize a violation of the law of nations
sufficient to trigger the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, it must “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.”60 Clearly, this grant gives the lower courts substantial
discretionary power, which Justice Scalia argued in concurrence was
“illegitimate.”61 The majority was not blind to the concern that district courts
would be too loose in their recognition of international law norms. Justice
Scalia argued that the “door” that leads to the creation of law under the
auspices of a jurisdictional grant was closed by events after the enactment of
55

Id. at 698–99.
Id. at 699.
57 Id. at 712.
58 Id. at 719.
59 Interestingly, the holding had been alluded to in prior case law. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit
equated the torturer with the pirate, referencing one of the three previously and sufficiently defined violations
of international law existing when the ATS was passed, vesting federal courts with universal jurisdiction.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1789, when the ATS was passed, Blackstone had
already identified three defined violations of the law of nations: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68
(William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1769). Also, in Amerada Hess, the Second Circuit stated in dicta, “Where the
attacker has refused to compensate the neutral, such action is analogous to piracy, one of the earliest
recognized violations of international law,” again referencing piracy as an established violation of the law of
nations. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’d, 488
U.S. 428 (1989).
60 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
61 Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argues that the decision gives “the Federal
Judiciary . . . a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.” Id. at 739.
56
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the ATS (most notably, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins62).63 Responding to
this, the majority employed some of the most cited language in ATS litigation
post-Sosa: “[C]onsiderations persuade us that the judicial power [to recognize
violations of the law of nations] should be exercised on the understanding that
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow
class of international norms today.”64
Sosa thus gave the lower courts the much-needed guidance to establish
jurisdiction under the ATS. Yet, the Court also injected uncertainty in another
area of contention in a footnote: “A related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm
to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.”65 With this, the Court created issues of whether
international law itself defined the scope of the “law of nations”66 and whether
that scope would stretch to cover corporations allegedly violating international
law. The Second Circuit provided a resolution to these issues in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
II. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
A. Facts and Procedural History
The facts of Kiobel arose from a conflict between the Ogoni people of
Nigeria and the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.
(“SPDC”).67 This company is a subsidiary of and wholly owned by Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company (“RDPC”) and Shell Transport and Trading
Company.68 The Ogoni region consists of approximately 400 square miles in

62

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The general common law was the old door. We do not
close that door today, for the deed was done in Erie.”); see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80.
64 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
65 Id. at 732 n.20 (emphasis added).
66 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
67 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472
(2011).
68 Id.
63
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southern Nigeria.69 In 1956, oil was discovered in the Ogoni region and, in
1958, SPDC began oil production in this area.70
Since the discovery, oil and gas have become vital sources of revenue for
Nigeria. Ninety-seven percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues and
79.5% of government revenues come from the oil and gas sectors.71 Moreover,
the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is involved in the
“joint venture” with SPDC, owning fifty-five percent of the venture.72 Because
of the oil extraction, the Ogoni people have watched as the region has been
decimated and ravaged by the extraction process, oil spills,73 and gas flaring—
the act of lighting excess gas from oil wells as waste, acknowledged as
“extremely wasteful and environmentally damaging.”74
In 1990, the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (“MOSOP”) was
formed to stage nonviolent protests against SPDC operations because of the
environmental damage.75 In 1992, MOSOP demanded compensation for the
environmental damage and, by 1993, more than half of the Ogoni population
participated in MOSOP protests.76 According to the allegations, SPDC enlisted
the help of Nigerian military officials to quell the protests, and the Nigerian
military forces attacked and looted Ogoni villages and raped and killed the
residents.77 A month later, a Nigerian military commander wrote in a
“restricted” memo that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless
military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to

69 See Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Ogoni Bill of Rights 3 (Dec. 1991) (proposed bill
of rights), available at http://www.mosop.org/Ogoni_Bill_of_Rights_1990.pdf [hereinafter Ogoni Bill of
Rights].
70 AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY IN THE NIGER DELTA 11 (2009),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8-a73c-a7a47
66ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf. But see Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 69, at 4–5 (claiming that oil was not
discovered until 1958).
71 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 70, at 11.
72 Id. at 12.
73 Id. at 14–16.
74 Id. at 18.
75 See About Us, MOVEMENT FOR SURVIVAL OGONI PEOPLE, http://www.mosop.org/about_us.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
76 See Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 69, at 3, 7 (noting that in 1991 there were approximately 500,000
Ogoni people; demanding restitution for “the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc.”); Events,
MOVEMENT FOR SURVIVAL OGONI PEOPLE, http://www.mosop.org/events.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011)
(noting that more than 300,000 Ogoni people attended Ogoni Day on January 4, 1993).
77 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472
(2011).
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commence,”78 the Ogoni plaintiffs allege that the letter announced that
“wasting operations” would be conducted during MOSOP protests.79 The
allegations also state that the military leader further instructed that “pressure”
was to be exerted on Shell for “prompt regular inputs” to support military
operations.80
Throughout these happenings, it is alleged that Dr. Barinem Kiobel, a
member of the Executive Council for the state encompassing Ogoni, opposed
the use of violence in the region.81 In May 1994, he received a letter from the
U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus outlining safety concerns for the
Ogoni population and requested that Dr. Kiobel “do everything in [his] power”
to prevent human rights violations.82 Plaintiffs allege that Kiobel forwarded the
memo to military officials.83 Further allegations state that two weeks later,
Kiobel was invited to attend a meeting concerning an upcoming constitutional
convention—necessitated by the seizure of Nigerian power by General Sani
Abacha.84 Plaintiffs allege that while Kiobel was elsewhere, taking care of
other business, the meeting degenerated and four Ogoni elders were killed.85
Allegations also state that Kiobel and eight other Ogoni activists, including
MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, were later arrested, detained, and
subsequently tortured; these nine people came to be known as the “Ogoni
Nine.”86
Allegations regarding the detention state that the conditions for Dr. Kiobel
and the rest of the Ogoni Nine were “brutal,” involving beatings and denial of
basic medical care and food.87 Plaintiffs allege that during this time, no charges
were filed against Dr. Kiobel.88 Allegedly, in November 1994, the Civil
Disturbances Special Tribunal (“CDST”) was created to administer “extra-

78

Id. at 189–90 (Leval, J., concurring).
Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 59, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 472, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 67–68, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491).
80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. ¶ 55.
82 Id. ¶ 60.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. ¶ 61.
86 See id. ¶¶ 61, 63; Karen McGregor, Ogoni Nine Hanged As Indifferent West Failed To Respond,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ogoni-nine-hanged-asindifferent-west-failed-to-respond-699325.html.
87 Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 79, ¶¶ 69–70.
88 See id. ¶ 65.
79

BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1

2012]

6/12/2012 8:13 AM

CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

237

judicial” sentences on those deemed to be “threats to public order.”89 Plaintiffs
allege that this tribunal convicted Dr. Kiobel of murder and he, along with the
rest of the Ogoni Nine, was executed after a sham trial.90
Twelve residents of Ogoni sued RDPC, inter alia, for their complicity in
violations of international law, alleging extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary
arrest and detention, and crimes against humanity in September 2002.91
Although concluding that aiding and abetting liability is permissible under
Sosa, the district court held that extrajudicial killings, property destruction,
forced exile, and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and
association were not sufficiently well defined to constitute a violation of the
law of nations, and thus, vest courts with subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATS.92 Yet, the district court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for
aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.93 Recognizing that this
case raises several controlling questions of law that provide “substantial
ground for difference of opinion,”94 Judge Wood certified the questions
presented for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.95
B. Majority Opinion
Kiobel’s majority first recognized that, because appellate review of cases
under the ATS has been uncommon,96 many issues surrounding the jurisdiction
granted by the statute have remained unresolved.97 The issue presented here is
one of those lacunae in ATS litigation, namely, “[d]oes the jurisdiction granted
by the ATS extend to civil actions brought against corporations under the law

89

Id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶¶ 3, 74. Petitioners allege multiple due process failures in the CDST trial, including detention
without charges, interference with meetings between counsel and the accused, threats of physical violence
against defense counsel, and provision of false testimony against the accused through bribes. See id. ¶¶ 3, 67–
69.
91 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472
(2011).
92 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463–64, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472.
93 Id. at 468.
94 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
96 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17 (“Thus, our Court has published only nine significant decisions on the
ATS since 1980 (seven of the nine coming in the last decade), and the Supreme Court in its entire history has
decided only one ATS case.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
97 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117.
90
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of nations?”98 The majority answered this question in two parts. First, the court
considered the body of law that governs the scope of ATS litigation:
international law or domestic law.99 Concluding that international law governs
the analysis and scope, the court then looked to the sources of international law
to “reveal” whether corporations can be subject to liability under the statute.100
To prove that international law governs the scope of ATS litigation, the
majority quickly looked to the treatment of the subjects of international law.101
Relying for the first of many times on the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg (“Nuremburg Trials”)—which was definitive in stating that
individual liability can attach for private individuals’ international law
violations—to prove that these subjects are defined by international law itself,
the court held that the subjects of international law were defined by
international law.102 To further vindicate the necessity of the foregoing
analysis, the court took guidance from footnote 20 of Sosa, where the Supreme
Court stated that a question to be answered by the lower courts was whether
international law extends its scope over non-state juridical entities such as
corporations.103 The court stated that to answer this question, it has long
followed the practice of scope-determination with reference to international
law, beginning with the rejuvenation of ATS in Filartiga.104 To support this,
the majority looked to Khulumani,105 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc.,106 Kadic v. Karadžić,107 and Judge Edward’s
concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.108 The majority claimed that
this is not an unusual analysis, that “[t]here is no principled basis for treating

98

Id. at 117.
Id. at 125–31.
100 Id. at 131–45.
101 Subjects of international law are “those that, to varying extents, have legal status, personality, rights,
and duties under international law and whose acts and relationships are the principal concerns of international
law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II, intro. note, at 70
(1987) (emphasis added).
102 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126–27.
103 Id. at 127–31; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
104 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (“In Filartiga, we had looked to international law to determine our jurisdiction
and to delineate the type of defendant who could be sued.”).
105 Id.; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
106 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009).
107 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995).
108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
99
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the question of corporate liability differently,” and thus, this holding should be
unsurprising.109
The majority then moved to the second, and more controversial, holding
that corporate liability is not sufficiently well defined to be a norm of
international law. The court recognized the primacy of the sources of
international law as identified in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and reproduced
part of Article 38.110 Attempting to delineate the norm of corporate liability in
international law, the court separated the analysis into an investigation of
international tribunals, international treaties, and works of publicists.111
Curiously missing from this analysis was an investigation into “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a clearly stated source of
international law in the ICJ Statute.112
Investigating international tribunals, the court again heavily relied on the
Nuremburg Trials and the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London Charter”)113
establishing them as the “single most important source of modern customary
international law concerning liability for violations of fundamental human
rights.”114 The London Charter granted jurisdiction over “persons . . . whether
as individuals or as members of organizations.”115 Yet, it also allowed the
tribunal to classify organizations as criminal.116 This notion seemingly detracts
from the court’s eventual conclusion, but the majority avoids this problem
109

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130.
Id. at 132; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38.
111 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–45. The Second Circuit primarily focused on their investigation of custom. As
for treaties, the court did indeed find treaties that would hold corporations civilly liable for international law
violations. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. The court rejected them as insufficient evidence of custom either because
they have not been ratified by the states upon which the greatest impact would be had or because they are
specially tuned to specific subject matter. Id. at 138 & n.40; see, e.g., Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime art. 10(1), done Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127; Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 2, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (Dec. 17,
1997). As for publicists, the majority and the ICJ Statute relegate them to a “subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.” ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(d); accord Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142.
Relying on two professors who testified in front of the court, the majority concluded, “customary international
law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143.
112 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). The court does speak to this in footnote 43. Kiobel, 621 F.3d
at 141 n.43. A further discussion of this terse dismissal of the authority of general principles appears later in
this Comment. See infra notes 135–43 and accompanying text.
113 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London Charter].
114 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–33.
115 London Charter, supra note 113, art. 6.
116 Id. art. 9.
110
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because the authority to determine the criminality of organizations was
“merely to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who were members of the
organization.”117 To illustrate this point, the court recounted the treatment of
the I.G. Farben chemical company.118
For their complicity and active participation in the atrocities occurring at
Auschwitz and their support of the Nazi regime, twenty-four executives of
Farben were charged with various crimes including “planning, preparation,
initiation and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries”
and “slavery and mass murder.”119 The corporation was not charged or named
in the indictment. The Nuremberg Court explained in now-famous language:
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced.”120
The Second Circuit moves from the Nuremberg Trials to other international
tribunals since Nuremberg.121 They examine the jurisdictional statutes for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International
Criminal Court (“ICC”).122 Both ICTY and ICTR expressly limited jurisdiction
to “natural persons.”123 Moreover, the court relies on negotiations during the
creation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome
Statute”)124—to which the United States is not a party—that rejected proposals
to impose corporate criminal liability.125 Thus, from their investigation of the

117

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 134 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 134–36.
119 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 14, 50 (1953); see also
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135.
120 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223
(1947); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135.
121 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136–37.
122 Id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), done July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex art. 5, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50, at 15 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; U.N.
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), Annex art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
123 ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5 (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction
over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present statute.”); ICTY Statute, supra note 122, art. 6
(“The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the
present Statute.”).
124 Rome Statute, supra note 122.
125 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137; see also Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1) (“The [International
Criminal] Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”); Albin Eser, Individual
118

BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1

2012]

6/12/2012 8:13 AM

CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

241

Nuremberg Trials and other modern international tribunals, the majority
concluded that corporate liability has not yet been sufficiently well defined by
these tribunals or by international law to have ripened into a norm of
customary international law.126 Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal, dismissed the remaining claims, and held that “customary
international law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its
norms.”127
Before moving on to the lengthy concurring opinion, two important points
are notable. First, the majority spends part of its introductory statements and a
whole section of reasoning discussing its points of disagreement with the
concurrence. During the introduction, the majority mentions that it “do[es] not
take lightly the passion with which Judge Leval disagrees with [its] holding”
and then proceeds to cite to every page in the concurring opinion during which
Judge Leval calls the majority reasoning “illogical,” “strange,” and “internally
inconsistent.”128 Then, after their primary analysis of the case, the majority
outlines four major points of disagreement with the concurrence, consuming
approximately three pages of its twenty-four page opinion.129
Briefly, the majority contends that Judge Leval inappropriately shifts the
burden to the court to find a norm of custom that justifies their ruling.130
Contrarily, the majority says that the burden to show a custom must be on
those attempting to invoke it.131 Second, it disagrees that a significant
distinction exists between the imposition of criminal and civil liability in
international law.132 Third, the majority contends that Judge Leval distorts its
holding by stating that corporations are never liable under international law for
violations of the law of nations.133 Finally, its disagrees that this case is

Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY
767, 778–79 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
126 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137.
127 Id. at 143.
128 Id. at 122.
129 Id. at 145–48.
130 Id. at 146.
131 Id.
132 Id. The court cites to Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani: “[I]nternational law does
not maintain [a] kind of hermetic seal between criminal and civil law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
133 Id. at 147.
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“merely a question of remedy to be determined independently by each
state.”134
The second notable point is the majority’s treatment of general principles
of law as a source of international law.135 In a footnote, the majority writes that
general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute, are a subsidiary means of
determining international law.136 It supports this statement by citing to the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States137 and
works of publicists.138 Further, they cite Judge Friendly in IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd.,139 who wrote:
We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs’ view that the Eighth
Commandment “Thou shalt not steal” is part of the law of nations.
While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part of its legal
system, a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has
been “a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules
or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their
140
common good and/or in dealings inter se.”

This terse dismissal of general principles of law is especially curious
considering that the majority reproduces the text of Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute in full (including Subsection (c) which lists general principles as a
source of international law),141 states that the Second Circuit has “long
recognized” the ICJ sources as “authoritative . . . sources of international
law,”142 and proceeds to structure their argument around custom, treaties, and
works of publicists.143
C. Concurring Opinion
Judge Leval wrote the concurring opinion. Because of the opinion’s length,
this Comment proceeds by examining Judge Leval’s five major points: (1) the
134

Id.
See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
136 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
138 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
139 Id.
140 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,
225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)).
141 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 134–45.
135
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creation of a rule versus the absence of a rule; (2) the question of remedy; (3)
criminal versus civil liability in international law; (4) the potential for abuse
told through hypothetical situations; and (5) the justification for dismissal.
First and most important is the difference in the characterization of the
court’s holding between the majority and the concurrence. The majority is
explicit in saying that they looked to customary international law to “reveal”
what it has to say about corporate liability and whether such a norm exists.144
Conversely, the concurrence characterizes the majority holding as a new “rule”
of international law.145 Whereas the majority views its analysis as deciphering
the custom of nations, the concurrence characterizes it as creating a new rule
that exempts corporations from the strictures of international law.146 This
difference reveals a deeper conflict between the views of the majority and
concurrence of how to apply customary international law.147
The concurrence sees the absence of any norm imposing corporate liability
as a grant of authority to the individual states to determine the remedy for
violations of international norms, the second main point of the concurring
opinion.148 According to Judge Leval, civil liability for violations of
international norms “is awarded in U.S. courts because the law of nations has
outlawed certain conduct, leaving it to each State to resolve questions of civil
liability, and the United States has chosen through the ATS to impose civil
liability.”149
Continuing the concept that the issue of remedy is to be left to the states
themselves, Judge Leval notes that no international tribunal exists with a

144 Id. at 125 (“[W]e consider what the sources of international law reveal with respect to whether
corporations can be subject to liability for violations of customary international law.”).
145 Id. at 149 (Leval, J., concurring). Throughout the opinion and in the point headings, Judge Leval refers
to the “rule” of the majority.
146 Id. at 151 (“The corporation, according to my colleagues, has not violated international law, and is
indeed incapable of doing so because international law does not apply to the conduct of corporations.”).
147 The majority reasoned that the absence of any norm that supports corporate liability is the exact proof
that no such norm exists and, thus, no subject matter jurisdiction can be maintained under the law of nations
and the ATS. Id. at 147 (majority opinion) (“We hold that corporate liability is not a norm that we can
recognize and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of human rights does
not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).”).
148 Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
149 Id. at 175. Moreover, if international law were to have a rule exempting corporations from liability (as
the concurrence characterizes the majority holding), that rule would have to be found in customary
international law and be sufficiently well defined. See id. at 164.
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structure to carry the jurisdiction consistent with the majority’s rule.150 No
international tribunal “has ever had jurisdiction to consider a private civil
remedy of any kind—either against a natural person or a juridical entity.”151
Moreover, if the remedy for violations of international law is not to be decided
by the states, then it follows that international law does not recognize liability
for natural persons either. The conclusion that no custom recognizes civil
corporate liability merely follows from the idea that there is “no rule of
international law making any private person civilly liable . . . . If the absence of
widespread agreement in the world as to civil liability bars imposing liability
on corporations, it bars imposing liability on natural persons as well.”152
The third major point of the concurring opinion is the distinction between
criminal and civil liability in international law. Judge Leval points out that the
majority mostly relied on the jurisdictional grants of international criminal
tribunals to justify their conclusion that corporate liability is not a cognizable
customary norm.153 The majority is correct that the international tribunals to
which they looked limited their jurisdiction to natural persons.154 Yet, the
concurrence sees this as a function of the differing purposes between civil and
criminal liability and not as a function of the international community’s denial
of corporate civil liability for violations of international law.155
This denial of criminal liability does not imply the denial of civil liability
upon juridical entities.156 Unlike the purposes of criminal liability, the purposes
of civil liability can be effectuated by holding corporations financially
responsible for their torts.157 Civil liability’s “principal objective” is to
compensate victims and restore them to their previous condition before the
150 Id. at 160 n.11; see also H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 126, at 266 (Archon Books 1970) (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW]
(“International jurisprudence is rough when there is no forum . . . before which to fight out its problems.”).
151 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163 (Leval, J., concurring). This argument is reminiscent of the views of Judge
Reinhardt in Unocal and Judge Hall in Khulumani that the controlling law for violations of the law of nations
is the common law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J.,
concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
152 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring).
153 Id. at 166 (“The only fact of international law to which the majority can point as evidence of its view
that international law does not apply to juridical persons is the fact that international criminal tribunals have
not exercised authority to impose criminal punishments on them.”).
154 See Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5; ICTY Statute, supra
note 122, art. 6.
155 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 168 (“The refusal of international organizations to impose criminal liability of
corporations . . . in no way implies that international law deems corporations exempt from international law.”).
157 Id. at 169.
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tortious damage.158 Additionally, this can be satisfactorily done only if the
liability is on the corporation, instead of the executives, because the corporate
entity earned the profit resulting from the illicit activities.159
Fourth, Judge Leval, from the outset, looks to the slippery slope to exhibit
the potential for abuse the majority holding could yield:
So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a trust),
will now be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ
armies to do dirty work for despots, perform genocides
torture prisons for a despot’s political opponents, or
160
piracy—all without civil liability to victims.

businesses
mercenary
or operate
engage in

He continues this analysis by providing hypothetical situations in which
corporations could perpetrate gross and heinous violations of human rights in
the area of slave trading (with an emphasis on sex-slavery), piracy, genocide,
and the aiding and abetting of these violations.161
Fifth and final, despite the lengthy reasoning of the concurring opinion
mostly discussing its divergence from the views of the majority, Judge Leval
agrees that the claims in this case should be dismissed. In doing so, he
combined the purposeful standard for aiding and abetting liability as stated in
Talisman162—and also by Judge Katzmann in Khulumani163—with the modern
pleading standard handed down in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.164 He then reviewed the
sufficiency of the pleadings for both SPDC and RDPC’s direct violations of
human rights and its complicity in those violations under the aiding and
abetting standard.165
It is important to note the complete lack of mention in the concurring
opinion of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”166
158

Id.
Id. Judge Leval notes in the same paragraph, “[I]t is the worldwide practice to impose civil liability on
corporations.” Id. Yet, nowhere in the concurring opinion are general principles as stated in the ICJ Statute
discussed.
160 Id. at 150.
161 Id. at 155–60. The majority dismisses these “hypothetical cases,” by merely reiterating their contention
that although corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS, those individual perpetrators responsible for
the corporate violation can. Id. at 147–48 (majority opinion).
162 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).
163 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).
164 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(originating the plausibility pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
165 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 188–96 (Leval, J., concurring).
166 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
159
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Whereas the majority simply dismisses them as a subsidiary source of
international law and turns only to custom to resolve the issues in this case,167
the concurrence ignores them altogether and relies on domestic law principles
to rebut the majority holding that the ATS provides no subject matter
jurisdiction over corporate defendants. This Comment proceeds by defining
and discussing this recognized source of international law.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The present version of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute recognizes
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of
international law along with custom, convention, and the works of scholars.168
This clause has its origin in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice (“PCIJ Statute”), Article 38(3).169 It was first proposed by Baron
Descamps, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Jurists.170 Draft
schemes from various countries phrased the intended source slightly
differently: “general principles of law” (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden),
“general principles of law and equity” (Germany and Brazil’s Clovis
Bevilaqua), “general principles of justice and equity” (Switzerland), and “rules
which, in the considered opinion of the Court, should be the rules of
international law” (alternative draft for Norway, Denmark, and Sweden and the
draft scheme of the Five Neutral Powers).171 The eventually adopted text was
proposed by Elihu Root, a U.S. statesman, although it is more commonly
attributed to his collaborator, Lord Phillimore.172
Regardless of the exact phrasing, the inclusion of “general principles of
law” was nothing new to the countries drafting the statute. The phrase was a
common one and codified in many municipal law systems.173 This rejection—
inherent in the omission of international general principles from the statute—of

167

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1).
169 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38(3), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 7
[hereinafter PCIJ Statute]. The PCIJ Statute did not use the numbering system currently employed in the ICJ
Statute, but instead the PCIJ Statute numbered subparagraphs with Arabic numerals, but did not number
paragraphs. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 2 n.4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953).
170 CHENG, supra note 169, at 7.
171 Id. at 7 & nn.24–27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 Id. at 14–15.
173 Id. at 19. The nations of three of the ten members who drafted the PCIJ Statute contained the “general
principles of law” in their municipal laws. Id.
168
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traditional international law sources recognized that the international legal
system is significantly less developed than most municipal legal systems; thus,
there will be lacunae where custom and treaty have not developed.174 The
insertion of general principles in the PCIJ Statute “was intended to provide a
solution in cases where treaties and custom provided no (clear) answers to the
case at hand.”175 By doing so, the ICJ could prevent a plea of non liquet—
dismissal on the basis of no controlling law.176 Moreover, general principles
will continue to serve important functions in less developed areas of
international law—such as human rights—to resolve issues “which neither
conventional nor customary law is ready to meet.”177
Yet, what exactly are “general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations”?178 Scholars have provided varying definitions such as “a core of legal
ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems”;179 “principles which
are so fundamental to every well-ordered society that no reasonable form of
co-existence is possible without their being generally recognized as valid”;180
and “norms underlying national legal orders . . . the manifestation of the
universal legal conscience certified by the law of civilized States.”181 The
consensus that emerges from these definitions is a recognition of “the existence
of a common core of objectively identifiable legal principles.”182 Some typical
general principles that have been recognized in international tribunals are those
such as estoppel,183 unjust enrichment,184 necessity,185 and proximate cause.186

174

See BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14.
Erika de Wet, Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the
International Court of Justice, 47 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 181, 185–86 (2000).
176 H.C. Gutteridge, The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, 38 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 125, 125 (1952).
177 M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law,” 11 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 768, 769 (1990).
178 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
179 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations,
51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (1957).
180 1 J.H. W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 59 (1968).
181 Johan G. Lammers, General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, in ESSAYS ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 53, 57 (Frits Kalshoven et al. eds., 1980) (quoting and
translating A. FAVRE, PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS [PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 275 (1974))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
182 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 771.
183 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
184 Lena Goldfields, Ltd., Arbitration (Sept. 3, 1930), as reprinted in Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration
Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31, 42–53.
185 S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17).
186 Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 29 (U.S.–Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1939).
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These principles can be derived from both national and international
sources.187
Before proceeding to examine examples and applications of general
principles as seen in international tribunals, there is another area of ambiguity
that should be addressed, namely, the difference between custom and general
principles. Neither is a superior source to the other according to both the plain
text of the ICJ Statute and the drafting history.188 The line of demarcation
between the two is unclear because both include “all that is unwritten in
international law.”189
A rule of customary international law is shown by proving that (1) the rule
has been followed as a “general practice” and (2) opinio juris.190 The first is
exhibited by actual practices of states inter se and is an objective inquiry, while
the second, opinio juris, is a subjective element and looks to why international
actors act according to the proposed custom.191 This second element is satisfied
by showing that states act according to the custom out of a “sense of legal
obligation or necessity.”192
In contrast, showing a general principle requires “recognition,” but has no
requirement of practice.193 This requirement of recognition makes the search
for and eventual use of a general principle more objective.194 Moreover,
general principles express a general truth that should guide action and be a
187 Regardless of their source, the underlying theoretical basis of the use of general principles raises issues
of natural law versus positivism. Although a thorough investigation of the theoretical and philosophical
underpinnings of the use of general principles is outside the scope of this discussion, Professor Bassiouni
provides a short summary:

[T]here is reason to believe that the framers of the PCIJ’s article 38 (I)(3) and the ICJ’s article
38 (1)(c) may have accepted the notion that natural law may be separate from the naturalists’
understanding of that term, and that it may arise from concrete applications and common practices
existing in and among “civilized nations.” Such a composite conception may be viewed as a
compromise between positivism and naturalism, if that is at all possible.
Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 774 (footnote omitted).
188 CHENG, supra note 169, at 20 (“[D]uring the discussion in the Committees of the First Assembly, the
words ‘in the order following’ (‘en ordre successif’) in the introductory phrase of the draft article were
deleted.”).
189 Id. at 23.
190 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 16.
191 Id. at 16–17.
192 Id. at 17.
193 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24.
194 De Wet, supra note 175, at 186. This objectivity emerges from the omission of an opinio juris-type
element that looks to the subjective reasons why states adhere to a custom.
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“theoretical basis” for solutions, while the rules of custom are practical and
binding.195 Additionally, as previously mentioned, custom is limited in its
sources to international law and the practices of states among each other, while
general principles can be derived from domestic and international law. The
subtlety of these differences is a function of international tribunals’ failure to
clearly demarcate the two sources and reluctance to decide cases on the basis
of general principles.196
An advocate attempting to use or rely upon general principles has a
difficult task. Both the PCIJ and ICJ have failed to explain the method by
which a general principle will be recognized by the court.197 Adding to the lack
of a methodology, the use of general principles suffers from a “paradox”
relating to the generality of the principle.198 Because the principle will be
evidenced by widespread recognition in the international community’s various
legal systems, the more abstract the principle is, the easier its mass recognition
is to prove.199 Yet, the more abstract the principle, the less useful it is in
solving legal disputes in international tribunals.200 Nevertheless, Professor
Lauterpacht has recognized that “international tribunals apply [municipal] law
whenever they deem it advisable; that States which are parties before an
international tribunal have, as a rule, recourse to analogies of private law,” at
least in the context of international arbitral tribunals.201
Despite these barriers, some guidelines have been espoused by the courts
and can be found in the writings of academics. In AM & S Europe Ltd. v.
Commission of the European Communities (“AM & S Case”),202 the European
Court of Justice looked to general principles of the European Community to

195 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24 (quoting and translating Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 551,
556 (It.–Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1903)).
196 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 791; see also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India),
1960 I.C.J. 6, 43 (Apr. 12); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT § 51, at 166 (1958) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT] (“Experience has
shown that the main function of ‘general principles of law’ has been that of a safety-valve to be kept in reserve
rather than a source of law of frequent application.”). In this case, the ICJ specifically refused to determine
whether the issue could be resolved by general principles, but instead relied on a practice and local custom.
Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 43.
197 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 796.
198 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14–15.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 126, at 267.
202 Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 1575.
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decipher a rule on legal confidentiality.203 The court surveyed the Member
States’ municipal law and presented each state’s view on the confidentiality of
documents between counsel and client.204 The court sought to derive a general
principle of European Community law to cover these communications.205
Although finding that this privilege was not identically stated in all the
Member States, it was sufficient that some states recognize the confidentiality
“inasmuch as it contributes toward the maintenance of the rule of law” while
others recognize that “the rights of the defence must be respected.”206 This
principle arises from “the purpose[] and in the interest[] of the client’s rights of
defence.”207
In the Delagoa Railway Arbitration, the tribunal based an award from
Portugal to the United States and Great Britain resulting from the Portuguese
government’s seizure of a railroad on “the general principles of the common
law of modern nations.”208 Doing so, the tribunal upheld the general principles
of compensation for damnum emergens (“material damage”) and lucrum
cessans (“loss of profit”).209 In the Cayuga Indians Claims Case,210 the
international arbitral tribunal looked to “considerations of justice, equity, and
right dealing” and adopted a corporate veil-piercing analogy to hold that the
Cayuga Indians were entitled to annuity shares under the Treaty of Ghent of
1814, inter alia.211
Yet, when investigating whether the international community of nations
recognizes a general principle, instead of merely European Community parties
as in the AM & S Case, the ease of identifying a unique principle is more
difficult. Three primary issues arise. First is the question of how many nations
must accept or evidence the general principle for it to be recognized. The ICJ
has rejected the notion of universal acceptance—the idea that it must be
evidenced by all nations.212 Thus, the principle should be evidenced by a

203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id. at 1610–13.
Id. at 1605–06.
See id.
Id. at 1610–11.
Id. at 1611.
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 128, at 271 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. § 128, at 270–73.
Great Britain ex rel. Cayuga Indians v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 173 (Am.–British Cl. Arb. Trib.

1926).
211
212

Id. at 180, 189.
BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 18.
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“representative majority” of nations, which includes the “principal” legal
systems of the world.213
Second is the question of how uniform the recognition of a general
principle must be for its utilization. In the AM & S Case, the Advocate General
argued that the principle does not have to be identically expressed or followed
in the European Community countries to be a recognized principle.214 Still, an
advocate must remember the paradox discussed earlier: the more countries, the
greater recognition, but also the less specific and useful the principle becomes.
A good example is the Gentini Case215 in which the Venezuelan Mixed Claims
Commission unquestionably recognized a principle of prescription—statutes of
limitations and repose—although it did not exactly set a numerical standard.216
The third question arising in an investigation to prove a general principle
arises from which countries must recognize the principle. The ICJ Statute says
that the general principles are those recognized by “civilized” nations.217 The
idea of “civilized” nations has been criticized and generally rejected as a
legitimate limitation on the use of general principles.218 Instead, the reference
to civilized nations refers to the major legal systems of the world, including the
common law tradition, civil law tradition, significant religious legal systems,
and other ideological legal systems (including socialist law).219
It is this general outline of the world’s significant legal systems that guides
the following discussion of corporate tort liability before returning to Kiobel
and applying the general principle to those facts. Generally, the discussion
looks to the laws of nations to prove that corporate tort liability is an
established and recognized principle in the major legal systems of the world.
Underlying this concept is the general principle of responsibility. In Factory at
Chorzów, the PCIJ stated that “it is a principle of international law, and even a
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an

213

De Wet, supra note 175, at 187.
Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1650 (opinion
of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn).
215 Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 551 (It.–Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1903).
216 Id. at 556.
217 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c).
218 Gutteridge, supra note 176, at 130–31.
219 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14. Because of the controversy surrounding whether socialist law
actually constitutes a separate and independent legal system in contemporary legal practice, its norms
concerning corporate liability are not examined. For a thorough discussion of this controversy, see John
Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781 (1989).
214
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obligation to make reparation.”220 This principle was also evidenced in a
Central American Court of Justice decision that provided “the complete
analogy between public and private law” when turning to a principle of
international responsibility on the basis of the private law conception of
fault.221 Thus, while looking to the text of municipal law systems to discover a
general principle of corporate tort liability, underlying most of the rationales
will be the general principle of responsibility.
IV. IMPOSITION OF CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY
A. Civil Versus Criminal
Before examining the world’s legal systems for principles of corporate civil
tort liability, an initial decision between civil and criminal liability must be
justified. This is not a trivial distinction. The majority’s reliance on
international—and primarily customary—criminal law in Kiobel was a major
dividing point between the majority and the stinging concurrence.222
The doctrine of corporate criminal liability was an accepted idea before the
French Revolution when its acceptance declined with the rise of the ideal of
individualism.223 The growing industrialization of the world’s economies
began to see courts struggling against the conceptual barriers against corporate
criminal liability. These arguments were similar in both the United States and
the United Kingdom and had three general points of contention. First, because
a corporation is a legal fiction, it is limited to actions for which it is legally
empowered—also known as the ultra vires rule.224 Second, corporations were
not contemplated to be able to have the requisite mens rea for perpetration of
criminal acts.225 Third, sanctioning difficulties arose: corporations cannot be

220 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13); see also Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (finding that Albania was “responsible” for injury and had “a
duty . . . to pay compensation”). For an excellent discussion of the general principle of responsibility, see
CHENG, supra note 169, 163–70.
221 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 135, at 287 (quoting Editorial, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 423,
436 (1909)).
222 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120–23 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 472 (2011).
223 Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493,
494 (1994).
224 Id. at 495.
225 Id.
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imprisoned or—as was the typical punishment for felonies in English courts—
executed or deported.226
Today, the ultra vires rule has eroded in the United States and the United
Kingdom.227 Three cases in the United Kingdom and a landmark U.S. Supreme
Court case have also overcome the hesitation of courts to impute mens rea to
the corporation through doctrines of vicarious liability.228 Canada overcame
this argument with strict and absolute liability regimes.229 The sanctioning
difficulties were resolved by the imposition of fines and other sanctions such
as loss of license, probation, or debarment—the loss of government
contracts.230 The French Penal Code allows for corporations to be fined up to
five times the maximum for individuals, while the Dutch Penal Code provides
that any criminal sanction applicable to an individual can be applied to a
corporation, except for those which cannot be (e.g., imprisonment).231
The currently problematic issue arising from international prosecution of
legal entities such as corporations is that no international tribunal has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate legal entities; their jurisdiction only extends to
natural persons.232 Although there is no “theoretical obstacle” to holding
corporations liable for violations of international law,233 negotiations to include
legal entities as subjects of adjudication for the International Criminal Court
failed in the formation of the Rome Statute.234 Thus, this form of liability is
generally available only in national legal systems.
Comparatively, the use of civil remedies provides two primary advantages
over the criminal system. First, the claims can be initiated by the victims
against which the crimes were perpetrated or their survivors.235 The advantage
226

Id.
L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1508, 1511 (1982).
228 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions
v. Kent & Sussex Contractors, Ltd., [1944] K.B. 146 (U.K.); Moore v. I. Bresler, Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. 515
(U.K.); R v. I.C.R. Haulage, Ltd., [1944] K.B. 551 (Crim. App.) (U.K.).
229 Stessens, supra note 223, at 497.
230 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477,
1497 (1996).
231 Stessens, supra note 223, at 516; see also CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] art. 131-41 (Fr.); WETBOEK VAN
STRAFRECHT [SR] [Criminal Code] art. 51 (Neth.).
232 INT’L PEACE ACAD. & FAFO, BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: ASSESSING THE LIABILITY OF
BUSINESS ENTITIES FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (2004).
233 Id.
234 INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 56 (2008).
235 See CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 22, at 4.
227
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here bypasses the need to involve possibly reluctant municipal authorities to
initiate the suit.236 Second, following from this and the general principle of
responsibility,237 the victims of human rights abuses can be paid damages
directly.238 Moreover, and particularly relevant here, civil tort liability to
compensate victims for damages is a longstanding principle in most nations,
while corporate criminal liability is still developing. Because of this long
tradition of domestic corporate liability and its worldwide acceptance, it was
erroneous for the Second Circuit to use vacuums in international criminal law
to justify their rejection of the civil litigation mechanism and the principle
revealed by an investigation into the general principles of law seen around the
world.
B. Common Law Jurisdictions
The common law jurisdictions handle issues of civil liability through the
law of torts.239 Tort law allows compensation to subjects of injury for protected
“interests” such as life, liberty, and property.240 According to William L.
Prosser, tort law serves five primary functions:
(1) to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who
might otherwise “take the law into their own hands”; (2) to deter
wrongful conduct; (3) to encourage socially responsible behavior; (4)
to restore injured parties to their original condition . . . by
compensating them for their injury; and (5) to vindicate individual
241
rights of redress.

Without even looking to the domestic law of tort in the common law
countries, holding corporations accountable for their torts furthers all five of
these goals, specifically in the context of the Kiobel facts, by deterring
vigilantism against the corporate entity while simultaneously deterring the use
of illegitimate means to quell protesting parties and instead promoting

236

See id.
Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 665, 667 (2006).
238 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he law of civil remedies may often provide victims with
their only legal avenue to remedy.”). The Rome Statute of the ICC does allow for victims to present views and
seek reparations and also allows for fines to be paid into a Trust Fund for victims. See Rome Statute, supra
note 122, art. 79. Yet, as previously mentioned, this court was not given jurisdiction over legal entities.
239 Torts, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/llm_jsd/grad_studies/courses/torts (last visited
May 4, 2012).
240 Id.
241 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 1–2 (12th ed. 2010).
237
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responsible means to solutions to restore those suffering injury to the status
quo and vindicating their rights of redress.
The corporation can incur tort liability in two ways: directly and
vicariously.242 Vicarious corporate liability is a form of strict liability regime
wherein the principal is absolutely liable for the torts of an agent as if it were
the tortious actor itself.243 Yet, this investigation merely seeks to decipher a
general principle that corporations are held civilly liable for their torts.
Kiobel’s holding is that international law has not sufficiently defined corporate
liability to be a cognizable customary norm such that U.S. courts would have
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.244 Thus, regardless of the doctrinal
mechanism through which liability is imposed on the corporate entity, the mere
fact that liability is imposed is sufficient for this investigation.
In the United Kingdom, the first real mention of vicarious liability in the
sense of an employer’s liability for harm caused by the employee while acting
in the scope of his employment is Hern v. Nichols245 in 1709.246 In this case, an
agent fraudulently represented the quality of silk he was selling.247 The
purchaser brought an action for deceit and the court held that the employer
should be liable civilly because he put “a trust and confidence” in the
deceiving employee.248 Although deceit can be considered an intentional tort,
vicarious liability traditionally did not cover intentional torts under
interpretations of the United Kingdom’s controlling Salmond test.249 This
recently changed in the United Kingdom in Lister v. Hesley Hall Limited,250
which held an employer vicariously liable for torts arising out of the sexual
242

PETER GILLIES, BUSINESS LAW § 40.6.2, at 949 (10th ed. 2001).
Reiner H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability, in CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 669,
674 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
244 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472
(2011).
245 Hern v. Nichols, (1709) 1 Salk. 289 (K.B.) (U.K.).
246 T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE LIABILITY OF EMPLOYERS, PRINCIPALS,
PARTNERS, ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE-UNION MEMBERS WITH A CHAPTER ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND AND
FOREIGN STATES 9 (1916).
247 Hern, 1 Salk. at 289.
248 Id.
249 Lister v. Hesley Hall Ltd., (2001) 1 A.C. 215, 223–24 (H.L.) (U.K.) (opinion of Steyn, L.). The
Salmond test refers to the position taken by John William Salmond, a famous English legal scholar. Salmond
posited that only acts, whether authorized by the master or not, “so connected with acts which [the master] has
authorised” could be the basis of vicarious liability. R. F. V. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32,
at 105 (11th ed. 1953). Because an intentional injury against another is almost never in the vein of those
authorized acts, an employer cannot be vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their employees.
250 Lister, 1 A.C. 215.
243
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assault of emotionally and behaviorally problematic boys by the warden of
their boarding annex.251
In the Lister opinion, Lord Steyn commented favorably on two recent cases
by the Canadian Supreme Court in this area of vicarious liability for intentional
torts.252 In one of these cases, the Canadian Supreme Court explicitly
referenced the use of the Salmond test, as evidence of vicarious liability’s
similar growth and application in Canada, borrowing from U.K. common
law.253 In this case, the court held a non-profit organization liable for torts
arising from the sexual assault of children by a caretaker at a residential childcare facility.254 Moreover, both Canada and the United Kingdom have stated
that to the extent that violations of international human rights laws give rise to
injuries cognizable as torts (such as assault, battery, false imprisonment), civil
remedies would be available.255 It seems to follow that if courts are
comfortable holding corporations and non-profits liable for sexual abuse
injuries inflicted by those under their control, then relief should be available
for providing funding for atrociously violent human rights violations.
The idea of vicarious liability for intentional torts is also seen in U.S.
jurisprudence. Respondeat superior is not limited to negligence, but also
extends to “willful and malicious torts of an employee.”256 Moreover, the
United States stands at the forefront of civil protection for the rights of
plaintiffs injured by breaches of international law because of the ATS itself.
Before the holding in Kiobel, it was presumed that corporations could be held
liable for these torts under the aiding and abetting theory, making the United
States a leader in corporate tort liability.257

251

Id. at 230 (opinion of Steyn, L.). It is interesting to note that the court here essentially overruled an
earlier case. Lord Steyn wrote that the earlier case was “carefully considered and reasoned,” but that the
court’s “allegiance must be to legal principle.” Id. at 223.
252 Id. at 230.
253 See Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534, 543 (Can.).
254 Id. at 567–68.
255 FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: CANADA 4–5 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/
Canada.pdf; STEPHEN POWLES ET AL., FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR
GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: UNITED KINGDOM 22 (2006),
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/UK.pdf.
256 Bussard v. Minimed, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 675, 679–80 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Farmers Ins.
Grp. v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 448 (Cal. 1995)).
257 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
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Finally, in Australia, employers are vicariously liable for intentional torts
committed in the course of employment.258 Again, citations to and use of the
Salmond test appear in the High Court of Australia’s opinion in New South
Wales v. Lapore.259 In this case, Judge Kirby wrote that the fact that the torts
were intentional was not a bar to vicarious liability and cited with approval the
Canadian and English cases discussed above.260
Thus, as can be seen from the above analysis of major common law
systems, the concept of liability for the corporate employer is not foreign in the
less egregious realm of negligence or in the field of intentional torts.
Therefore, the common law clearly recognizes a principle of law that holds
corporations liable for tortious conduct committed in furtherance of their
interests.
C. Civil Law Jurisdictions
The civil law tradition traces its existence from ancient Rome and is the
most prominent legal system in the world.261 Although controlled by a large
body of statutory law, a de facto system of precedent deriving from
interpretations of the statutes has begun to develop and has become especially
important in the French law of delicts whose treatment in the Code Civil is
quite general.262 As well as the developing reliance on judicial rulings between
the civil and common law systems, similarities in vicarious liability exist. The
solutions given by the civil law jurisdictions and the common law jurisdictions
are similar.263
Looking at many civil codes, their general treatment of corporations and
liability for torts follow similar patterns: early provisions give the corporation
some sense of legal personality such that it is given rights and incurs
obligations, and later provisions provide for principles of reparation for
tortious harm committed by those with legal personality.264 Although this
pattern is not uniform, it is the general treatment pertinent to this discussion.

258

See New South Wales v. Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 547 (H.C.) (Austl.) (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.).
Id. at 511.
260 Id. at 603–04, 623.
261 JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 3 (1995), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/civillaw.pdf/$file/civillaw.pdf.
262 Id. at 31.
263 Kwame Opoku, Delictual Liability in German Law, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 230, 230 (1972).
264 See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT
[RGBL.] 195, as amended, §§ 21–22, 823, 831 (Ger.).
259
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The French civil code, which Napoleon considered his greatest
achievement and has influenced countless other civil codes worldwide,265 has a
quite broad treatment of torts. Article 1382 states that any act that causes
damage to the other creates an obligation to compensate the victim by the
person at fault.266 Article 1384 codifies vicarious liability by stating that a
person is also liable for damages caused by those for whom he is
responsible.267 The French civil system is highly influential and has been
adopted, either in part or in whole, in many countries including Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Egypt.268
The German civil code has also been highly influential amongst the world’s
civil law systems.269 Sections 21 and 22 provide for the legal personality of
associations.270 Section 823 imposes liability for intentional or negligent injury
of life, body, health, freedom, property, or another right.271 The liability for
vicarious agents is outlined in Section 831 for those “who use another person
to perform a task” when that person unlawfully inflicts damage while “carrying
out the task.”272 The principal can be exculpated from this liability if
reasonable care was taken in selecting the agent causing the tortious injury.273
Japan’s civil code is more straightforward in its treatment of the liability for
legal persons. Article 44 provides that a juridical person will be liable for
damage to others caused either by its directors or other agents while
performing their duties for the corporation.274
The civil code in Russia is written with extraordinary clarity. Like the
German code, Articles 48 and 49 provide for the concept and legal capacity of
the legal entity, which the Russian code defines as an organization that has its
own “set-apart property and . . . is answerable by its obligations with this

265
266
267
268

APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 14 n.5.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.).
Id. art. 1384.
R. W. Lee, The Civil Law and the Common Law—A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. REV. 89, 92–94

(1915).
269

APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 1.
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195,
as amended, §§ 21–22 (Ger.).
271 Id. § 823, para. 1.
272 Id. § 831, para. 1, English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/
englisch_bgb.html.
273 Id.
274 MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 44, para. 1 (Japan).
270
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property.”275 Article 1068 provides that a “legal entity . . . shall redress the
injury inflicted by the employee” as well as for the liability of “[e]conomic
partnerships and procedure cooperatives” when injury is inflicted by its
“participants (members).”276
In Norway, business entities domestically domiciled can have both civil
and criminal actions brought against it for actions committed within and
outside of the country.277 Compensation is available for “personal bodily
injury, loss of future income and for the assumed future expenses that will be
debited to the harmed person,” and if the victim is harmed in a “lastingly and
considerable way,” they are entitled to compensation for that injury.278
The Spanish civil law was responsible for the spread of civil law in Central
and South America.279 Article 35 of the Código Civil280 classifies corporations
as juridical persons whose personality begins from the moment they are validly
constituted and states that associations of private interest are granted individual
personality independent from that of each of its members.281 Article 1902
generally imposes liability for tortious injury while Article 1903 states that this
recompense for damage is demandable from those of persons for whom others
must respond, announcing a general vicarious liability principle.282
The Chilean civil code is significant because it greatly influenced many
other Latin American legal systems and was either adopted entirely or used as
a model in Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, El Salvador,
and Nicaragua.283 Article 54 states that people can be either legal or natural
persons.284 Article 552 imputes the acts of agents as those of the corporation
and Article 2314 states that people committing torts are liable to compensate

275 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] arts. 48–49 (Russ.), English
translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=247776.
276 Id. art. 1068, English translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=247777.
277 FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: NORWAY 20–21 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/
Norway.pdf.
278 Id. at 20.
279 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 16.
280 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Spain).
281 Id. art. 35.
282 Id. arts. 1902–03.
283 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 17.
284 CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] art. 54 (Chile).
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the victim.285 Thus, reading Articles 552 and 2314 in pari materia, vicarious
liability is established.
The Brazilian civil code has been called the “greatest monument to legal
thought and codification in Latin America.”286 Article 45 gives corporations
legal existence and personality when they register.287 Article 932 provides the
liability for employers for torts committed by agents and employees.288
Although this is by no means a complete treatment of every national civil
legal system, it stands as a proper representation of the treatment of
corporations in the civil law tradition. To provide a final justification for the
general principle, the European Group on Tort Law (“European Group”) sheds
some light in its 2005 publication of the Principles of European Tort Law.289
Article 4:202 of these principles provides for what the European Group calls
enterprise liability.290 This article imposes liability on those using “auxiliaries”
(the European Group’s term for agents or employees) for the harm caused by
those auxiliaries.291 Moreover, Article 6:102 expressly provides for liability
when damage is caused by an auxiliary acting “within the scope of their
functions.”292 Thus, as the European Group and the previous investigation of
national civil codes reveals, the civil law tradition embraces the general
principles of tort liability for corporations by giving them legal personality and
holding them liable through the vehicle of vicarious liability.
D. Theological Legal Systems
1. Jewish Law
Jewish law, or Halakha, is sparse on its treatment of legal entities and
corporations.293 Multiple perspectives for analyzing the modern corporate

285

Id. arts. 552, 2314.
APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
287 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 45 (Braz.).
288 Id. art. 932.
289 See Bernhard A. Koch, The “European Group on Tort Law” and Its “Principles of European Tort
Law,” 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 194 (2005).
290 EUR. GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW art. 4:202 (2005), available at
http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf.
291 Id.
292 Id. art. 6:102.
293 See Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The
Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1691 (1997).
286
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entity have been developed by Jewish law scholars.294 The perspective most
similar to the secular concept of corporations is called the Halakhic entity
approach.295 Under this perspective, Jewish law recognizes the corporations as
the owner of corporate assets, and thus a separate entity from the shareholders
just as secular law does.296
In the area of tort law, Halakha generally does not recognize the principle
of vicarious liability.297 Yet, two important points mitigate the potential
evisceration of a general principle that would hold corporations liable for their
torts. First, in an investigation to discover a general principle, it does not have
to be recognized by all nations “so long as there is evidence that is applied by a
representative majority which includes the principal legal systems of the
world.”298 Thus, the absence of this norm in Halakhic tradition does not
immediately deprive the world of a general principle of corporate tort liability.
Second, Jewish law recognizes the doctrine of dina de’malkhuta dina, or “the
law of the land is the law.”299 Thus, in the nations of the world that would hold
a corporation liable, such as the common law or civil law traditions, Jewish
law would allow this imposition, although not provided for in Halakha.
2. Islamic Law
Islamic, or Sharia, law designates rules and regulations governing the lives
of the practitioners of Islam.300 Its influence spread far beyond its birthplace in
the Arabian peninsula and Lower Mesopotamia.301 As the Arab empire spread,
Sharia law spread to Spain and Central Asia.302 Before the Islamic Revolution
in Iran in 1979, the only country with a completely Islamic legal system was
Saudi Arabia.303 After 1979, Iran and Sudan replaced “Western style laws with
an Islamic legal system” and, to a lesser degree, Libya and Pakistan as well.304

294

Id. at 1695–97.
Id. at 1738.
296 Id. at 1738–39.
297 Id. at 1779.
298 De Wet, supra note 175, at 187.
299 Broyde & Resnicoff, supra note 293, at 1696.
300 MAWIL IZZI DIEN, ISLAMIC LAW: FROM HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS TO CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE 35
(Atl. Publishers & Distrib. first Indian reprt. 2005) (2004).
301 Gamal Moursi Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 187, 187–
88 (1978).
302 Id.
303 JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 24 (1999).
304 Id.
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Sharia law has primary sources in the Quran and Sunnah and also recognizes
secondary sources in “the interpretations and opinions of the learned jurists.”305
In the commercial sphere, the goal of the law of Islam is not to inhibit fair
trade and commerce, but “to allow people to earn their living in a fair and
profitable way without exploitation of others.”306 Sharia originally did not
recognize the existence of the juridical entity that is a corporation, and the
concept that a partnership would exist as an entity separate from its partners
developed only recently as a function of Western influence.307 Although
assuming a type of legal “capability,” or dhimma, this capability does not
endow Islamic corporations with a liability shield as seen in the West.308
Moreover, Sharia expounds the rule of strict liability as the “bedrock” of
judicial actions under Islamic tort law such that only the tortfeasor is liable for
a particular tort action.309
Today, the idea of juristic personality has been recognized by most of the
Islamic countries in the Middle East, including those who base regulation on
Sharia rather than Western law, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, Oman, and Qatar.310 Yet, in the field of vicarious tort liability, the
scholars seem to be divided. Some suggest that respondeat superior has no
place in Islamic law according to the principle of strict liability for responsible
tortfeasors.311 Others use the term fiqh “al-‘āqilah” to apply to those people
(“employers”) who can bear the responsibility of diyah (“blood-money”) on
the employee’s behalf.312
This latter concept of fiqh “al-‘āqilah” is similar to that seen in many
common and civil law traditions, which impute the act of the employee “as if
the employer caused the loss or damage himself.”313 Thus, there is no
theoretical obstacle to the imposition of tort liability on a corporate entity in
Islamic law. Yet, this conclusion may not have fully solidified. The concept of
305
306
307

Id. at 26.
Id. at 160.
Nabil Saleh, Arab International Corporations: The Impact of the Shari‘a, 8 ARAB L.Q. 179, 180

(1993).
308

Id. at 180–81.
Abdul Basir bin Mohamad, Vicarious Liability: A Study of the Liability of Employer and Employee in
the Islamic Law of Tort, 15 ARAB L.Q. 197, 197 (2000) [hereinafter Bin Mohamad, Employer].
310 Mahdi Zahraa, Legal Personality in Islamic Law, 10 ARAB L.Q. 193, 206 (1995).
311 See F. M. Goadby, The Moslem Law of Civil Delict As Illustrated by the Mejelle, 21 J. COMP. LEGIS. &
INT’L L., no. 2, 1939, at 62, 72–73.
312 Bin Mohamad, Employer, supra note 309, at 198.
313 Id. at 202.
309

BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1

2012]

6/12/2012 8:13 AM

CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

263

a juridical entity was not in the writings of classical Islamic scholars314 and is
developing as a result of Western influence.315 Moreover, the idea of vicarious
liability may have been previously rejected, but is now receiving scholarship
and validity from Islamic theorists.316 Thus, although the precise recognition of
corporate tort liability is unclear in Islam, it appears there are no significant
barriers to its development.
Of the systems and national legal structures analyzed, agency and vicarious
liability are common themes. Returning to the United States, in the modern era
of corporate tort liability under the ATS, the theory of aiding and abetting or
complicity in human rights abuses was the primary cause of action against
corporations.317 Yet, this concept is unnecessary and its controversy moot if
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS as a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction.318 Yet, as this discussion concludes, corporate civil liability is a
general principle of international law, and this doctrine, as applied to Kiobel,
should not prevent the imposition of aiding and abetting liability for
international law violations—assuming that aiding and abetting liability is a
sufficiently specified or recognized norm of the law of nations.319
V. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO KIOBEL
In this Part, this Comment first looks to the panel majority’s treatment of
general principles and its misplaced reliance on the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Next, it looks to the concurring
opinion to show that, although Judge Leval followed a method similar to that
314

Zahraa, supra note 310, at 202.
Saleh, supra note 307, at 180.
316 See Bin Mohamad, Employer, supra note 309, at 205; see also Abdul Basir bin Mohamad, Vicarious
Liability: A Study of the Liability of the Guardian and His Ward in the Islamic Law of Tort, 17 ARAB L.Q. 39,
47 (2002).
317 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007); see also INT’L COMM’N
OF JURISTS, FACING THE FACTS AND CHARTING A LEGAL PATH 8–16 (2008) (describing different methods in
which a corporation may be held liable).
318 Aiding and abetting liability for corporations due to their role in human rights abuses has been a
widely covered area of legal scholarship. See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human
Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 322–24 (2008); Chimène I.
Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 69–73 (2008); Jonathan
Drimmer, Jonathan Drimmer on the Aiding and Abetting Conundrum Under the Alien Tort Claims Act
(LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis, No. 2388, 2008), available at http://w3.lexis.com/research2/
attachment/popUpAttachWindow.do?_m=bc584ba883eadc5f45a4aaefbd67939d&wchp=dGLzVzBzSkAA&_md5=985c110a099dfbb3c9a4b0387bdd22da.
319 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani,
504 F.3d 254; Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
315
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of application of general principles, he nevertheless ignored this important
source. Third, this Comment analyzes the full bench of the Second Circuit’s
denial of rehearing en banc and deals primarily with Chief Judge Jacobs’s
arguments and how they could be remedied by the use of general principles.
This Comment then applies the above-determined general principle and
suggests how the Supreme Court may have alluded to and endorsed its use.
Finally, this Comment will look at the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in
Kiobel.
A. Majority Opinion Analysis
The majority’s classification of the use of “general principles” as being a
matter of domestic law320 is a mischaracterization for two reasons. First, the
majority cites to Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.321 for the concept that
customary international law does not view “universally proscribed” conduct
under domestic law as relevant for purposes of determining what customary
international law truly is.322 This is not an inaccurate statement of the law in
that general principles are not a consideration in the custom inquiry. Yet, this
phrasing in Flores confuses and conflates two separate sources of international
law. Whereas custom looks to the norms and mores to which states have
abided in their relations inter se,323 the formulation “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations” is an implicit rejection of the necessity to look
to the relations among the states. If general principles were to somehow be
derived from the actions of states in their interactions with each other, then it
stands to reason that the general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute,
would have referred to international law, as the statute expressly did when it
established international custom as a source.324 Thus, although the court in
Flores was correct in saying that the investigation into custom does not
consider general principles relevant,325 this does not support the idea that
general principles cannot act as their own source in providing independent
rules of decision and scope of liability determinations. Adding to this, a

320 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 141 n.43 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct.
472 (2011).
321 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
322 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43 (“Even if [certain] conduct is universally proscribed by States in their
domestic law, that fact is not necessarily significant or relevant for purposes of customary international law.”)
(quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 249).
323 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
324 See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38.
325 Flores, 414 F.3d at 252.
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hierarchy between custom, treaty, and general principles was explicitly
rejected in the drafting of Article 38.326
Second, the Second Circuit also relied upon the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,327 which actually undermines their
ultimate conclusion on the value of general principles to international law.
Section 102(4) of the Restatement states: “General principles common to the
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or
international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of
international law as appropriate.”328 Even the comment to which the majority
cited and on which it relied in rejecting general principles admits that they can
be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in special
circumstances.”329
Thus, it is appropriate to argue that corporate liability for international law
violations is a special circumstance warranting the invocation of those general
principles that the world’s major legal systems have recognized. To this point,
comment (l) to § 102 of the Restatement lists specific rules that have been
drawn from Article 38(c) of the ICJ Statute, namely, “rules relating to the
administration of justice, such as the rule that no one may be judge in his own
cause; res judicata; and rules of fair procedure generally.”330 It is logical that
these would not be evidenced by customary international law. Disallowing a
person “to be judge in his own cause” is not a principle of the type that would
ordinarily be embodied in the sources of custom as evidenced by the practice
of states inter se. It is one that follows from the basic concepts of law and its
practical operation. These examples evidence the function of general principles
as filling gaps or lacunae in international law.331
Moreover, the same comment goes on to say that general principles can
also provide “‘rules of reason’ of a general character, such as acquiescence and
estoppel, the principle that rights must not be abused, and the obligation to
repair a wrong.”332 The Restatement’s inclusion of principles such as that

326
327
328

Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 782.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(4), at 24–25

(1987).
329

Id. § 102, cmt. (l), at 28.
Id. § 102, cmt. (l), at 29.
331 See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (3d
ed. 2006).
332 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 102, cmt. (l), at 29 (emphasis added).
330
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“rights must not be abused” and an “obligation to repair a wrong”333 is a direct
parallel with the one of the purposes of tort liability—“to restore injured
parties to their original condition . . . by compensating them for their injury;
and . . . to vindicate individual rights of redress.”334 Thus, the Restatement
seems to provide an argument for the use of general principles to derive
corporate liability under the ATS, undermining the majority’s reliance on one
sentence in the comment to Section 102.
B. Concurring Opinion Analysis
The key fault with the concurring opinion is its position on the role and
power of domestic law in holding corporations liable for civil damages. Judge
Leval repeatedly maintained a position evidenced by the argument that “[t]he
position of international law on whether civil liability should be imposed for
violations of its norms is that international law takes no position and leaves
that question to each nation to resolve.”335 First, it stands to note that he
provided no citation or support for this proposition. He merely moved from a
lacuna in the scope of international law to the application of domestic law. In
doing so, he skipped right over the very concept that would resolve his conflict
and put him more in line with the correct statement of international law,
namely the application of general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.
The position for which Judge Leval advocated is not dissimilar to the
application of general principles. He used a concept that is well known in U.S.
law to fill the gap in international law concerning the liability of corporations
for their torts committed against aliens. This does not significantly differ from
taking the general principle seen in the world’s major legal systems, including
the United States, and applying it here to uphold corporate liability. The use of
general principles recognizes the authority of the ICJ Statute and looks to
municipal law to determine what the law is on the issue. Although his assertion
is correct that generally international law is indifferent as to the enforcement of
its rules, Judge Leval applied only the domestic principles of the United States,
which “draws no distinction in its laws between violators who are natural
persons and corporations.”336
333

Id.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 241, at 1–2.
335 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
336 Id.
334
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C. Denial of Rehearing
In February 2011, the Second Circuit denied rehearing in Kiobel.337 Three
separate opinions were filed: a dissent from Judge Leval and concurring
opinions from Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes (the author of the
Kiobel panel majority opinion).338 Whereas Judge Cabranes filed just a
paragraph, mostly supporting the Kiobel panel reasoning and rejecting claims
that it was motivated by a policy agenda,339 Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge
Leval filed heated opinions, directly addressing each other’s arguments.
Because the views posited in these arguments have erroneous propositions and
this case presents an opportunity to use general principles, this Comment
analyzes the denial opinions, primarily Jacobs’s concurrence.
Unlike the opinion of the Kiobel panel, Chief Judge Jacobs’s concurring
opinion to the denial of a rehearing is full of foreign policy considerations.340
Generally, he posited that because “foreign companies are creatures of other
states” and are “often engines of their national economies,” then American
courts are overreaching in ATS litigation by exerting the “power to bring to
court transnational corporations of other counties . . . and to beggar them by
rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
(American) legal fees,” thus undermining comity.341 He then referred to
statements made by South African President Thabo Mbeki characterizing the
Khulumani decision as “judicial imperialism.”342 He closed his policy
considerations by arguing that there is no danger of other states protecting their
corporations from judicial action in their home state because “no one would
protect any enemy of all mankind.”343

337 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011). A request for a rehearing en banc
was also denied on the same day. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011).
338 Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 268.
339 Id. at 272 (Cabranes, J., concurring).
340 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). Judge Leval stingingly dismisses most of Jacobs’s policy
arguments:

I do not contend by any means that all of Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns are frivolous. If it were
the proper role of a panel of the U.S. courts to make and implement the foreign policy of the
United States, some of his concerns would call for serious attention and evaluation.
Id. at 273 (Leval, J., dissenting).
341 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
342 Id.
343 Id.
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Chief Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns are misguided and, even those that
are not, can be remedied by means significantly less severe than the result in
Kiobel provides. Kiobel’s bright-line prohibition on actions against
corporations under the ATS itself is “seizing the initiative to make foreign and
domestic policy”344 by restricting access to U.S. courts under an erroneous use
of international law, namely the rejection of general principles. Moreover,
many of his concerns about “judicial imperialism” are applicable to ATS
actions against natural persons as well as corporations.345 Yet, he does not call
for the repeal of the ATS to thwart this concern.
Especially striking is Chief Judge Jacobs’s naïveté in suggesting that
foreign states have no interest in protecting corporations that are perpetrating
international law violations. This is striking because of Jacobs’s recognition
that actions may be against corporations that are the “engines of their national
economies.”346 If the engine of a state’s economy is in danger because of suits
arising from its complicity in human rights violations, that state has a
substantial interest in not bringing them to justice. This is one of the main
advantages of the ATS’s use of the civil suit mechanism: the victims (or their
survivors) can bring the claims themselves in the face of a potentially reluctant
state prosecutor. Also not mentioned by Jacobs is an alternative to the brightline prohibition found in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which could
easily deal with issues of American versus foreign adjudication.
Chief Judge Jacobs also argued contradictorily by stating both that Kiobel
is “of no big consequence”347 and also that Kiobel “matters.”348 He stated first
that it is unimportant because the court’s earlier holding in Talisman—wherein
the court adopted the purposive standard for aiding and abetting liability—has
foreclosed ATS suits against corporations to the “vanishing point.”349 On the
other hand, he argued that Kiobel is important because, without it, “plaintiffs
would be able to plead around Talisman in a way that (notwithstanding Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal) would delay dismissal.”350 Both
of these contentions are vulnerable to criticism.

344
345
346
347
348
349
350

Id. at 273 (Leval, J., dissenting).
See id. at 276.
Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Judge Leval rightly pointed out the “strange logic” of Jacobs’s use of
Talisman.351 If Talisman’s standard will dismiss all but the most heinous and
factually supported ATS claims, then Kiobel’s only role is to exonerate all but
the most heinous and factually supported ATS claims.352 Responding to the
contrary argument for Kiobel’s importance, his terse dismissal of the pleading
barrier provided by Iqbal is inapposite. Undoubtedly, Iqbal made the motion to
dismiss stage more difficult for plaintiffs to surpass by requiring a plausible
claim for relief and even more so in litigation whose evidence and facts span
multiple nations.353 Chief Judge Jacobs’s terse dismissal of the weight and
difficulty in pleading provided by Iqbal and Twombly does not give enough
credit to this initial barrier.
Chief Judge Jacobs also raised another issue that could be easily solved by
the use and application of general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. He wrote: “The imposition of liability on corporations, moreover,
raises vexed questions. What employee actions can be imputed to the
corporation? What about piercing the corporate veil? . . . Punitive damages is a
peculiar feature of American law; can they be exacted?”354 Questions such as
these beg for the use of general principles because they are unlikely to be
evidenced by custom. General principles fill the lacunae of international law
where the domestic legal systems of the world have already come to a
consensus. Questions about scope of actions, veil piercing, and punitive
damages awards could be easily solved by looking to the legal systems of the
world as evidence of an accepted treatment.
D. Certiorari Granted
On October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel.355
Because of the Second Circuit’s sua sponte decision to consider the corporate
liability issue of as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
certified a second question in its grant, namely, “[w]hether the issue of
corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’), 28 U.S.C.

351

Id. at 276 (Leval, J., dissenting).
Id. at 275–76 (“In other words, the defendants who secure exoneration by the operation of the
majority’s rule are the ones who acted most heinously, such as slave traders, pirates, and mercenaries who
contract to torture and carry out genocides.”).
353 Leslie A. Gordon, Convoluted in Courts: For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a
Catch-22, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 16, 16.
354 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
355 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
352
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§ 1350, is a merits question . . . or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”356
This Comment will briefly discuss the significance of this issue.
It is important to consider the consequences of the Court’s decision on this
issue. If the question of whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS is a
question of subject matter jurisdiction, then the Second Circuit committed no
error by raising it sua sponte. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3),
a court must dismiss an action if it “at any time” determines that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.357 If, however, the Court finds that the corporate
liability issue is a merits question, then it was improper for the Second Circuit
to raise the issue and dismiss on that basis.
Most recently, the Court looked at whether the extraterritorial application
of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act was an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.358 Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated, “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask
what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.”359 Thus, the Court
held that this issue was a merits question. In this case, the Court held that the
jurisdictional statute (§ 78aa) supporting the substantive cause of action
(§ 10(b)) allowed for jurisdiction.360
Similarly, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,361 the Court looked at Title VII’s
requirements to determine whether the fact that an employer did not meet the
statutory definition of an “employer” was an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction.362 Yet, like in Morrison, the term “employee” does not appear in
the actual jurisdiction-granting provision of Title VII, but in a substantive
definitional provision.363 The Court expressed concern about “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings”364 wherein “[j]udicial opinions . . . often obscure the
356 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491); see also Kiobel v. Royal
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutchDutch
Petroleum,
SCOTUSBLOG,
petroleum-et-al (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). For an excellent treatment of the jurisdictional question in Kiobel,
see generally Kedar Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute,
27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
357 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
358 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
359 Id. at 2877.
360 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 78aa (Supp. IV 2010).
361 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
362 Id. at 504–07.
363 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (“Each United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions
brought under this subchapter.”).
364 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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issue by stating that the court is dismissing for lack of jurisdiction when some
threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether
the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to
state a claim.”365
Considering Morrison and Arbaugh, Kiobel presents a similar situation. In
Kiobel, the Second Circuit considered whether a corporate defendant could be
subject to suit under the ATS’s jurisdictional support.366 The Second Circuit
looked to a jurisdictional statute, but considered a subject and issue not
mentioned within the statutory language, namely whether a particular
defendant can be sued. In Morrison, the Court looked to where someone could
be sued and held that it was a merits question.367 The issue of where someone
could be sued was not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute.368 In
Arbaugh, the Court considered whether someone fit a substantive definitional
provision and held that it was a merits question.369 The specific term whose
definition was not met (“employer”) was not mentioned in the jurisdictiongranting statute.370 And here, in Kiobel, the Court will consider whether a
particular entity is within the reach of the jurisdiction-granting statute.371 And,
like in the two cases above, the defendant (or the persons capable of being a
defendant) is not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute (the ATS). It
seems that Morrison and Arbaugh are directly applicable and this issue is one
of merits, not one of jurisdiction.
Yet, this should not be the kill switch on the Court’s analysis. Even though
in Morrison the majority found that the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) was a
merits question, the Court stated that because none of the lower courts’
analyses relied on the mistake of whether the issue was jurisdictional or went
to the merits, a remand on this issue was unnecessary.372 The Court then
continued to consider whether § 10(b) was indeed extraterritorial.373 Because a
“remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule

365 Id. (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
366 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
367 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
368 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006).
369 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516.
370 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006).
371 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491).
372 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
373 Id.
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12(b)(1) conclusion,”374 the Court should still consider whether corporations
are shielded from ATS liability, regardless of the Court’s conclusion on the
subject matter jurisdiction versus merits question.
E. Application of the General Principle
After investigating the world’s legal systems, looking to the Kiobel
opinions, and recognizing their underlying error by ignoring general principles
of law, the application of this general principle that corporations can be held
liable for their perpetration and furtherance of tortious injury is simple. The
ATS claims against RDPC should be allowed to go forward, at least to a
factual inquiry of sufficiency of the pleadings under Iqbal. Judge Leval, while
vehemently dissenting against the majority reasoning, found these pleadings to
be insufficient under this test.375 The fact that there was sufficient ground to
dismiss all of the Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims for insufficient pleadings
increases the curiosity of the broad and unexpected majority holding on an
unbriefed issue.
Dismissing this case on the jurisdictional ATS issue was against the weight
of authority of both the Second Circuit and other courts. Although the majority
is correct that unresolved issues “lurk[ing] in the record . . . are not to be
considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents,”376 the
weight of authority which has either assumed that corporate ATS liability is
available or allowed the suit to go forward without deciding is unquestionably
persuasive.377 Moreover, Kiobel creates a direct circuit split with the Eleventh
Circuit.378 In light of all this authority, the reasoning behind the majority’s

374

Id.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 188–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
376 Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
377 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir.
2009) (assuming without deciding corporate liability); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
282–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (declining to decide the issue because it was not raised by
the defendant); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing claims for forced labor,
murder, and rape without determining state action); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d
86, 105–08 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing claims for aiding and abetting terrorism due to lack of intent);
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs stated a
“color of law” requirement sufficient to sustain claims under the ATS).
378 See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). Since Kiobel’s decision, the
circuit split has deepened. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e join
the Eleventh Circuit in holding that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate
immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of
375
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reluctance to utilize general principles to resolve this question in favor of the
weight of assumptions, suppositions, and an opposite holding is baffling.
Adding to the force of this conclusion, the use of general principles should
meet the strictures of the Supreme Court’s test in Sosa. Sosa’s requirement that
“any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized” allows for the acceptance of a general principle.379 General
principles are “norm[s] of international character” to the extent that they are
one of the three principal sources of international law, as outlined in the ICJ
Statute.380 The objective search for recognition and precise definition of the
general principle should meet the specificity requirement of the holding as
well. Thus, the Supreme Court may have already hinted at and subtly endorsed
the solution to the Kiobel problem, which the Second Circuit so casually
rejected.381
CONCLUSION
A. Implications of Kiobel
The immediate effect of the Second Circuit’s decision is apparent:
corporations will not be held liable for their torts in violation of the law of
nations. Shortly after this decision was written, but before filing, the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed an ATS suit on
the same grounds as Kiobel.382 In this opinion, the district court undertook an
extensive review of the justifications for previous impositions of corporate
liability including logical extensions and stare decisis arguments.383 Just like
the majority in Kiobel, the Central District of California dismissed the use of
general principles in a footnote.384

nations.”); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (holding
that “corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute”).
379 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (emphasis added).
380 Id. at 725; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1).
381 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 141 n.43 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
382 Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
383 Id. at 1130–33.
384 Id. at 1144 n.70.
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Reading that opinion together with the Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision,
the two are strikingly similar. Yet, neither provides a sufficient basis to refute
one of Judge Leval’s arguments in his concurring opinion. Judge Leval argued
that the remedy afforded by the ATS is not one that was handed down by
international law, but was the judgment of Congress addressing a perceived
need for a remedial measure for violations of international law cognizable at
the time of its passage.385 As such, a judgment of Congress is susceptible to
judicial interpretation in the face of conflict and ambiguity. Obviously,
Congress did not speak to jurisdictional requirements concerning legal entities
explicitly or implicitly in the statute. Thus, it is entirely consistent with U.S.
jurisprudential practice to hold corporations liable.
The Kiobel majority extols their previous investigations of customary
international law as proof that they have engaged in the same analysis to
determine the scope of liability under international law.386 Yet, the majority’s
reliance on their decision in Kadic is slightly mischaracterized.387 Although
they are correct that they looked to customary international law to determine
whether non-state actors could be individually liable for international law
violations, they did so exclusively in relation to the particular substantive norm
attempting to be established.388 They did not make a blanket statement that
individual actors could or could not be liable for international law violations as
a bright-line rule. Thus, it is incorrect to state that their analysis in Kiobel—
wherein they did wholly deny corporate liability with no relation to any
particular substantive norm—follows necessarily from their analysis in Kadic.
Moreover, the majority overstates the clarity of the Kadic analysis and
holding. In that case, they held that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or
only as private individuals.”389 By limiting this holding to “certain forms of
conduct,” this is a far cry from the establishment of an international norm
holding individuals (natural persons) liable for their international law
violations under the ATS. Thus, following another of Judge Leval’s arguments,
385

Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 175 (Leval, J., concurring); see also Sosa, 504 U.S. at 725.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (“Likewise, in Kadic v. Karadzić, . . . international law provided the rules by
which the court decided whether certain conduct violated the law of nations when committed by non-state
actors.”) (citation omitted).
387 In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that some specific violations of international law were cognizable
and recognized under the court’s ATS jurisdiction whether committed by states or individuals. See supra
Part I.
388 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241–44 (2d Cir. 1995).
389 Id. at 239.
386
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it seems that this limited holding that is far from clear or bright line cannot
stand for the proposition that individual liability for those not acting under the
auspices or color of state is a recognized norm of the community of nations. If
the majority cannot justify this foundational premise of ATS liability, then it
seems inapposite for them to extend it to juridical entities.
The decision also implicates procedural barriers. The Supreme Court
rejected the complaint in Ashcroft v. Iqbal for failure to state a “plausible”
claim for relief against the Attorney General for discrimination infringing on
constitutional protections.390 This substantially limited complainants’ access to
the tools of discovery to attempt to find evidence of a notoriously difficult-toprove claim: discrimination. In the post-Kiobel world, the ability of an ATS
litigant to get to discovery has been significantly curtailed. As in Iqbal—and
its predecessor, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly—establishing a “plausible”
claim, such as discrimination, anti-competitive practices, or purposeful
provision of aid and resources in furtherance of human rights abuses, against
the individuals in charge of entities that are as complicated as the U.S.
government and most transnational corporations, has now become even more
difficult.391
Considering the implications of this decision, further questions arise: What
effect would the opposite result have yielded? How could the Second Circuit
have perhaps come to the same ultimate conclusion without completely
abandoning any form of corporate liability under the ATS? The answers to
these questions and their impact on the current state of ATS litigation will be
discussed next.
B. Alternative Solutions
The decision in Kiobel is the most extreme of any solution that the Second
Circuit could have contemplated. They decided the matter without any specific
briefing from the parties on the matter of corporate liability and only a cursory
mention of the issue occurring late and covering barely two pages of RDPC’s
brief.392 This Comment proceeds to consider the alternative means by which

390

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009). Iqbal stands as the current case law on the
specificity required in complaints to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Gordon,
supra note 353, at 16.
391 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952–53; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
392 See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 30–31, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv).
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the court could have concluded this case with varying degrees of impact on the
state of ATS litigation.
Most obviously, the court simply could have dismissed on insufficiency of
the pleadings. This is the view adopted by the concurring opinion.393
Considering the fact that this was not part of the question certified for
interlocutory appeal by Judge Wood from the Southern District of New
York,394 it may seem inappropriate for the appellate court to engage in the
factual inquiry. Yet, the concurrence also handles this argument. An order
certifying questions for the appellate court focuses more on the order and not
the question, as “it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling
question identified by the district court.”395
Another alternative is to follow the approach and conclusions of the district
court in this case by analyzing the particular and allegedly violated norms to
determine whether they have the sufficient specificity in international law to be
cognizable under the ATS. The district court held that wanton destruction of
real and personal property, forced exile, and extrajudicial killing were not
sufficiently defined; while also holding that torture, arbitrary detention, and
crimes against humanity were.396 Just as easily and in a significantly less
extreme manner, the Second Circuit could have examined international law to
determine whether the violations alleged in the multiple counts of the
complaint were actually “defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms” recognized at the time of the ATS’s
enactment.397 Instead of slamming the door shut on all forms of corporate
liability, the court could have followed prior practice and looked to the
substantive norms being alleged to decide the case.
Alternatively, the court also could have cleared up the murky and
contentious state of aiding and abetting corporate liability theories in the
opinions of this circuit and others. Judge Leval contends that they should
follow the purposeful standard as articulated in Talisman.398 This approach

393

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 188 (Leval, J., concurring).
Id. at 124 (majority opinion).
395 Id. at 191 n.52 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d
86, 95 (2d Cir. 2004)).
396 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472.
397 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
398 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 192–93 (Leval, J., concurring).
394
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would affect only the second major holding of the majority.399 In Talisman, the
majority primarily looked to Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani400
to determine whether the source of the standard for aiding and abetting liability
should derive from domestic law or international law.401 With this approach,
the Kiobel court’s first holding would go unaffected.
This approach employed by Judge Katzmann and the Talisman majority,
although not as detailed as the Kiobel discussion, is similar and pertinent to
this case. Judge Katzmann wrote that the Second Circuit has repeatedly
emphasized that “the scope of the [ATS’s] jurisdictional grant should be
determined by reference to international law.”402 The first part of the
majority’s reasoning does not deviate from this practice. The Kiobel majority
cited to the exact quoted language above in coming to its first holding that
international law itself governs the scope of international law as applied under
the ATS’s jurisdictional requirement that courts look to the law of nations.403
Thus, the court could then move to an analysis of the standard to be met in
actions for aiding and abetting liability. Specifically, they could have more
clearly defined whether the mens rea standard in these actions is knowledge
that actions taken would further human rights violations or a purpose to do
so.404 Although the knowledge standard has been evidenced in international
tribunal proceedings,405 it is most likely that the court, like the concurring
opinion, would follow the arguments of Judge Katzmann in Khulumani and
Talisman and adopt the purposeful standard. This has an additional advantage
to the critics of ATS litigation generally.
The use of a higher standard of mens rea in complicity liability could stem
the fears of some in the business community that the ATS intrudes too much in
a corporation’s business activities and interactions with foreign entities. RDPC,
arguing that private aiding and abetting liability should not be recognized in
399 This is the holding that ultimately provides the court’s conclusion—that corporations are not liable
under the ATS. See supra Part II.B.
400 Judge Katzmann reasoned in his Khulumani concurrence that the source of the aiding and abetting
liability standard derived from international law. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring).
401 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009).
402 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
403 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128.
404 Compare Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (recommending purposeful
standard), with Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (adopting knowledge standard).
405 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, ¶ 117.
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this case, implied this concern: “Blanket recognition of private liability for
aiding and abetting or conspiracy would render all those who do business in
foreign countries liable for the acts of those governments, so long as a plaintiff
alleged some cooperation between the government and a private defendant.”406
One scholar has noted the impact and flood of litigation that widespread
recognition of an aiding and abetting liability standard would have on
enforcement of labor rights in foreign countries.407 Thus, the use of the higher
purposeful standard would stem the fears of unwarranted intrusion in corporate
affairs by a multitude of plaintiffs’ claims from around the world.
Yet another approach the Second Circuit could have employed in the
Kiobel decision is similar to that of their decision in Kadic v. Karadžić. Kadic,
although not as clear as the Kiobel majority made it seem, was an examination
of whether private individuals not acting under color of state could be held
liable for violations of international law under the ATS.408 The Kadic holding
did not necessarily validate the bright-line use of the ATS in actions against
private individuals, but instead held that “certain forms of conduct” violated
international norms regardless of status as state or non-state actors.409 The
Kadic court continued by looking to these “certain forms” such as genocide,
war crimes, and other instances inflicting death, torture, and degrading
treatment as relating to individual culpability for these actions.410 This raises
an alternative treatment in that the court could specify which claims against
corporations are sustainable under the ATS. This alternative would also clear
up the fears, raised in Sosa, inherent in requiring the district courts to interpret
international law to find a cognizable norm. Moreover, this investigation
would be substantially aided by looking to general principles to ascertain what
conduct is abhorred in the domestic law spheres of the world. This would be a
more appropriate and balanced approach to the issue of corporate liability than
making an extraordinarily wide-reaching holding on an unbriefed issue while
quelling some of the practical difficulties that the ATS jurisprudence presents
to the lower courts.
The final and significantly broader ground upon which the Second Circuit
could have ruled is that the court could have denied the availability of a cause
406

Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 392, at 17.
Wesley V. Carrington, Note, Corporate Liability for Violation of Labor Rights Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1381, 1414–15 (2009).
408 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
409 Id. at 239.
410 Id. at 241–44.
407
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of action for aiding and abetting under the ATS entirely. Unquestionably this
would require an overturning of precedent in the circuit.411 Yet, it would not
conflict with mandatory authority from the Supreme Court, which has never
reached the issue. Additionally, this solution is no more extreme than simply
denying relief against a whole class of defendants as a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction and was actually a conclusion of a Southern District of New York
ruling post-Sosa: “[T]he [ATS] presently does not provide for aider and abettor
liability, and this Court will not write it into the statute.”412
Although the court could not have effectuated it, one more solution to this
problem lurks in ATS litigation and is actually hinted at by the majority in
Kiobel. The majority wrote, in conclusion, “[N]othing in this opinion limits or
forecloses corporate liability other than the ATS—including the domestic
statutes of other States—and nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses
Congress from amending the ATS to bring corporate defendants within our
jurisdiction.”413 From this, it is clear that a congressional mandate could bring
corporations back within the scope of the ATS. This is not as unlikely a
scenario as it may seem. Congress has previously codified at least one
violation of international norms beyond the three recognized paradigms, which
served as the basis of the Sosa decision—the Torture Victim Protection Act.414
Yet, it is also clear that pro-corporate interest lobbying efforts would not sit
quietly while Congress attempted to provide a means of possible worldwide
corporate liability in U.S. courts.
C. Best Alternative Solution and the Future of ATS Corporate Litigation
The final conclusion of this Comment is that the best alternative method by
which the Second Circuit could have resolved Kiobel—instead of erecting an
artificial jurisdictional barrier—is the application of general principles of law
recognized by the world’s legal systems. In fact, in a post-Kiobel case, the
D.C. Circuit endorsed the application of general principles in its wellresearched and lengthy opinion in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.415 This
conclusion does not run counter to either the United States’ practice of holding

411
412
413

See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009).
In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472

(2011).
414 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as a note following
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
415 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 53–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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corporations liable for their torts, or with the world’s recognition that this
liability exists and is in the best interest of protecting victims of tortious injury.
Instead, the court has allowed for the possibilities presented by Judge Leval’s
slippery slope.416 Although the results may not be as extreme as Leval posited,
the potential for abuse of Kiobel’s conclusion is most certainly possible. The
majority attempts to mitigate this consequence by pointing back to their
contention that individuals in the corporate structure responsible for human
rights abuses could be held liable.417
Yet, the deterrent effect of this holding is quite weak considering the
massive amount of discovery and litigation involved in suits against
transnational corporations and the difficulty in having enough information to
allege which exact officer or manager was responsible for authorizing an
action leading to an international law violation at the motion to dismiss stage,
notwithstanding the increasing difficulty of proving it later in the case. Adding
to this difficulty is the fact that officers and directors change with some
frequency in the corporate arena. The responsible defendant may be far
removed from the corporation and information may no longer be available to
prove the claim. Thus, the potential for abuse is not as mitigated as the
majority would like to argue.
The use of general principles to allow for corporate liability combined with
the purposeful standard from Talisman leads to the best balancing of the forces
at play in ATS litigation. The use of a higher mens rea standard stands as a
substantial and fair barrier to curb the fears of the business community
concerning unwarranted judicial interference in their foreign business dealings.
Yet, for plaintiffs crossing the Talisman barrier with the most heinous of
human rights and international law violations, the path to relief would remain
open under this approach; whereas, under the Kiobel holding, these most
terrible violations will go unpunished.
Future litigation of this issue and others in U.S. courts’ determinations of
international law must look to general principles as a source. As the worldwide
trend in international law is toward increased protection of human rights,
increasingly more secondary procedural and minor issues will arise.418 General
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at 28 (1987) (noting that general principles can be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in
special circumstances”).
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principles of law can be the tool used by courts to accommodate the rise of
these issues. Moreover, general principles were formulated to do just this,419
and their importance will only increase in future suits under the United States’
“legal Lohengrin”—the Alien Tort Statute. For the United States—where a
revolution in human rights litigation was sparked by Filartiga—to deny
compensation to plaintiffs injured by the most heinous of international law
violations because of legal incapacity of juridical entities is entirely
inconsistent with general principles of law and deals a significant blow to the
vindication of human rights in U.S. courts.
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